Restructuring the U.S. Tax Court: A Reply to Stephanie Hoffer and Christopher Walker\u27s The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism by Lederman, Leandra
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2014
Restructuring the U.S. Tax Court: A Reply to
Stephanie Hoffer and Christopher Walker's The
Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism
Leandra Lederman
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, llederma@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lederman, Leandra, "Restructuring the U.S. Tax Court: A Reply to Stephanie Hoffer and Christopher Walker's The Death of Tax
Court Exceptionalism" (2014). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1391.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1391
 1 
Restructuring the U.S. Tax Court: A Reply 
to Stephanie Hoffer and Christopher 





  INTRODUCTION   
The U.S. Tax Court is an unusual adjudicative body. On 
the one hand, it is a federal court with an enormous volume of 
cases involving complex issues worth billions of dollars in the 
aggregate.1 On the other hand, it originated as an executive 
agency2 and its judges still lack life tenure.3 By statute, it is an 
Article I court,4 but its place in the federal government is 
sufficiently unclear5 that there is significant confusion over 
which branch it belongs to.6 
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Policy Roundtable, and participants in a University of Kentucky College of 
Law Faculty Workshop. Angela Ayala, Joseph Dugan, Brandon King, and 
Brenton Tunis provided valuable research assistance. Copyright © 2014 by 
Leandra Lederman. 
 1. In fiscal year 2010, for example, the Tax Court closed cases with an 
aggregate tax deficiency in issue of $4.66 billion. See 2000–2010 U.S. TAX CT. 
ANN. REP., tbl.4 (on file with author). 
 2. Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 
Part II: Creation of the Board of Tax Appeals—The Revenue Act of 1924, 40 
ALB. L. REV. 53, 95–96 (1975) (“[T]he Board was established as an 
independent executive agency.”). At the time, it was called the “Board of Tax 
Appeals.” Id. at 56. 
 3. See I.R.C. § 7443(e) (2012) (“The term of office of any judge of the Tax 
Court shall expire 15 years after he takes office.”). 
 4. Id. § 7441 (“There is hereby established, under article I of the 
Constitution . . . the United States Tax Court.”).  
 5. Compare COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, 
POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS 2 (2008), available at http://www 
.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/2008/index.html (listing the Tax Court in the 
legislative branch), and COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2004/pdf/GPO-PLUMBOOK-
2004.pdf (same), with COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE 
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The Tax Court is an exceptional federal court in many 
ways. It is a trial court located in Washington, D.C.,7 that 
conducts trials nationwide,8 with appeals from its decisions 
heard around the country by the regional courts of appeals.9 Its 
judges are appointed by the President of the United States, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate10—like Article III 
judges11—but Tax Court judges serve for terms of fifteen 
 
OF REPRESENTATIVES, POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012/content-detail.html (not 
listing the Tax Court at all). 
 6. See, e.g., Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding 
that the Tax Court is part of the executive branch despite taxpayer’s argument 
that the Tax Court is in either the judicial branch or the legislative branch 
and that the President’s right to remove a Tax Court judge violates separation 
of powers); Harpole v. United States, No. A00-176CV (HRH), 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17697, at *8 (D. Alaska Nov. 3, 2000) (“The Tax Court is an Article I 
court, which is independent of the executive and legislative branches of the 
government and is considered part of the judicial branch of the government.”); 
Ostheimer v. Chumbley, 498 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D. Mont. 1980) (“[T]he Tax 
Court was established as a court under U.S. Const. art. I , and became a part 
of the legislative branch of government in 1969.”), aff’d, 746 F.2d 1487 (9th 
Cir. 1984); cf. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (finding, in the context 
of an Appointments Clause challenge to the assignment of a case to a Special 
Trial Judge, that the Tax Court was not an Executive “Department” but 
rather was a “Court of Law” within the meaning of Article II, and stating that 
the “Tax Court remains independent of the Executive and Legislative 
Branches.”).  
The larger question of how legislative courts can be constitutional is 
beyond the scope of this essay. For an argument that they are constitutional, 
see Paul M. Bator, The Constitution As Architecture: Legislative and 
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990) (“[I]n 
general, I believe it is naïve—as well as undesirable—to think of separation of 
power rules as capable of creating sealed chambers each of which must contain 
all there is of the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers. Overlap is 
inevitable.”).  
 7. I.R.C. § 7445 (“The principal office of the Tax Court shall be in the 
District of Columbia . . . .”). 
 8. See Places of Trial, U.S. TAX CT., http://ustaxcourt.gov/dpt_cities.htm 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
 9. I.R.C. § 7482(a). By contrast, the Court of Federal Claims, which also 
has trial-level jurisdiction over certain federal tax cases, has appeals from its 
cases heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(3) (2012). 
 10. I.R.C. § 7443(b) (“Judges of the Tax Court shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, solely on the 
grounds of fitness to perform the duties of the office.”). 
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court and all 
other Officers of the United States.”). 
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years.12 The court’s Chief Judge is elected by the Tax Court 
judges themselves, not appointed by the President of the 
United States.13 The court’s judicial officers, called Special Trial 
Judges, are hired by the Chief Judge and serve at will,14 not for 
eight-year terms as magistrates do.15 Unlike other federal 
courts, the Tax Court’s budget requests are heard by Congress’s 
tax-writing committees, not the committees on the federal 
judiciary.16 And the Tax Court is unusually lacking in 
accountability. Unlike most other federal courts,17 it is not 
subject to the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts,18 nor is its 
procedural rulemaking governed by the Rules Enabling Act.19 
 
 12. I.R.C. § 7443(e). 
 13. Id. § 7444(b) (“The Tax Court shall at least biennially designate a 
judge to act as chief judge.”). 
 14. Id. § 7443A(a) (“The chief judge may, from time to time, appoint 
special trial judges who shall proceed under such rules and regulations as may 
be promulgated by the Tax Court.”); Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 44 (2005) 
(“[S]pecial trial judges have no fixed term of office . . . .”). 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (2012) (“The appointment of any individual as a 
full-time magistrate judge shall be for a term of eight years . . . .”).  
 16. Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 
Part IV: The Board Becomes a Court, 41 ALB. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977) (“[T]he court 
submits its budget requests directly to Congress and has a good deal of 
flexibility in establishing its internal administrative procedures.”); Stephan B. 
Paul III, International Conference of Courts with Income Tax Jurisdiction: 
Responses Provided by Participant Countries to the Discussion Agenda, 8 VA. 
TAX REV. 255, 296 (1988) (“The [Tax] Court primarily deals in Congress with 
the tax writing committees. Appropriations are by subcommittees handling 
treasury and general government appropriations—not the judiciary.”). 
 17. See Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal To Make the U.S. Tax 
Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2008). Interestingly, 
“[t]he U.S. Court of Federal Claims, an Article I court that provides a forum 
for trial-level litigation of claims against the federal government, is treated as 
part of the judiciary for these purposes.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 18. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the 
Federal Courts, reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 145 n.17 (1995) (“[O]ther Article I 
courts—the United States Tax Court, United States Court of Veterans 
Appeals, and United States Court of Military Appeals—either exist as 
independent entities or receive administrative support from the executive 
branch.”). 
 19. See Federal Courts Study Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 
4644, 4652 § 405 (“The amendments made by this title shall not affect the 
authority of the Tax Court to prescribe rules under section 7453 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”); I.R.C. § 7453 (“[T]he proceedings of the Tax 
Court and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of 
practice and procedure . . .  as the Tax Court may prescribe . . . .”); see also 
Lederman, supra note 17, at 1247–48 (“[The Tax Court] seems to have fallen 
into a gap between the branches of government so that it experiences the 
disciplining effect of neither the provisions—such as the APA and FOIA—that 
are applicable to agencies, nor the bodies or provisions—such as the AOUSC, 
the Judicial Conference, and the Rules Enabling Act—applicable to federal 
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Tax exceptionalism has been much maligned recently. 
Several prominent legal scholars have decried it,20 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has famously objected to carving out a tax-
specific rule for judicial review of agency action.21 I have long 
advocated for the abandonment of tax insularity, including in 
the specific context of tax procedure.22 Insularity impedes the 
flow of information, leading to inefficient parallel efforts to 
solve similar problems. I have argued that tax lawyers and 
other lawyers can learn from each other.23 Tax need not 
automatically be treated as exceptional; instead, tax issues 
should only be treated differently when there are good reasons 
to do so.24 
 
courts.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax 
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2006) 
(“[T]he view that tax is different or special creates, among other problems, a 
cloistering effect that too often leads practitioners, scholars, and courts 
considering tax issues to misconstrue or disregard otherwise interesting and 
relevant developments in non-tax areas, even when the questions involved are 
not particularly unique to tax.”); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 
VA. TAX REV. 205, 251 (2012) (“[I]t is a serious mistake to start from the 
premise that tax law is exceptional.”); cf. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or 
Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 
517, 518 (1994) (decrying the “myth . . . that tax lawyers are somehow 
different from other lawyers” and “the related second myth that tax law is 
somehow different from other areas of the law”); Steve R. Johnson, 
Intermountain and the Importance of Administrative Law in Tax Law, 128 
TAX NOTES 837, 838 (2010) (“As is true of other specialties in law, there is a 
tendency toward insularity in tax practice. Because of the ever-growing 
complexity of the law, this tendency is understandable, but ultimately 
untenable.” (footnote omitted)); Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing Tax 
Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of 
Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 183 (1996) (arguing that tax law’s 
“insularity has the unfortunate consequence of depriving tax and other fields 
of cross-fertilization”). But cf. Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit 
Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1910 (2014) (“[T]here is nothing 
exceptional about tax exceptionalism. In fact, to the extent the anti-
exceptionalists assume subject-matter exceptionalism is a phenomenon 
peculiar to tax, they are—ironically—engaging in a bit of tax exceptionalism of 
their own.”).  
 21. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704, 713 (2011) (“In the absence of . . . justification, we are not inclined to 
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the 
contrary, we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a 
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.’” (quoting 
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))).  
 22. Lederman, supra note 20, at 244–45. 
 23. Id. at 183–84. 
 24. Cf. Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1919–20 (“I favor a fairly strong 
presumption against special rules for tax . . . . But . . . tax is still special, and 
one cannot rule out the possibility that upon occasion the force of that 
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Because the Tax Court has traditionally been isolated from 
other courts—lacking membership in the U.S. Judicial 
Conference,25 for example—it generally has followed its own 
approach on many issues that confront courts.26 For example, 
until a Supreme Court decision in 2005 that commented on the 
Tax Court’s unusually nontransparent approach to procedural 
rulemaking,27 the Tax Court did not circulate draft rules for 
public comment.28 It also does not assign judges randomly to 
cases, probably because it would be very difficult to do so and 
hear cases in cities around the country without sending 
numerous judges to the same city.29  
Recent scholarship addressing tax exceptionalism has 
focused primarily on administrative law issues.30 In fact, the 
 
specialness may be enough to overcome the presumption against a special rule 
for tax.”). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 610 (2012) (“As used in this chapter the word ‘courts’ 
includes the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States, the 
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District 
Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States 
Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade.”); see also 
Lederman, supra note 17, at 1209, 1241–42. 
 26. Sometimes, though, the Tax Court voluntarily adopts procedures 
applicable to other federal courts. For example, in 2007, the Tax Court 
adopted the “private seminars disclosure policy established by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States in September 2006.” Press Release, U.S. Tax 
Court, The Court Has Adopted the Privately Funded Seminars Disclosure 
Policy Established by the Judicial Conference of the United States (Apr. 26, 
2007), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/042607.pdf. 
 27. Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 59–60 (2005). 
 28. See Press Release, United States Tax Court, Amendment to Rules of 
Practice and Procedure Adopted (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http:// 
ustaxcourt.gov/press/092105.pdf (“In Ballard v. Commissioner, the United 
States Supreme Court commented on the Tax Court’s lack of public 
rulemaking procedures . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 29. See B. Anthony Billings et al., Are U.S. Tax Court Decisions Subject to 
the Bias of the Judge?, 55 TAX NOTES 1259, 1260 (1992) (“The chief judge 
assigns a trial judge to a particular city when enough docketed disputes 
accumulate to justify a full term of the Tax Court. The judges travel among 
appointed trial venues based on the assignments made by the chief judge.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of 
Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 258–59 (2009) 
(“Meanwhile, as the proper categorization of Treasury regulations for APA 
purposes remains in dispute, both Treasury regulations and the CB and IRB 
continue to state, as they have for decades, that IRB guidance documents ‘do 
not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations.’” (quoting 
Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1987))); Kristin E. Hickman, 
Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with 
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1727, 1806 (2007) (“In promulgating regulations interpreting the I.R.C., 
Treasury does a poor job of following the APA’s procedural requirements. 
Treasury’s regular use of temporary regulations and occasional promulgation 
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issue that the U.S. Supreme Court resolved by striking a blow 
against tax exceptionalism was the question of whether 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.31—probably the most famous administrative law case32—
provides the deference standard for tax regulations, or whether 
a tax-specific precedent applies.33 The Death of Tax Court 
Exceptionalism brings this administrative law exceptionalism 
question to the Tax Court.34 
The specific issue that The Death of Tax Court 
Exceptionalism focuses on is whether the provisions in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for review of agency 
decisions determine the standard and scope of review the Tax 
Court applies to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) decisions or 
whether the Tax Court can apply different standards—
typically, “more searching de novo review.”35 The title of their 
article suggests the answer that Professors Hoffer and Walker 
espouse: the APA should apply,36 which would result in more 
across-the-board deference to the IRS than the Tax Court has 
shown.37  
 
of final regulations without notice and comment is inconsistent with the 
default requirements of APA section 553.”); Johnson, supra note 20, at 839 
(“Copious case law and commentaries have examined whether and how 
Chevron applies in the tax arena.” (footnotes omitted)); Zelenak, supra note 20, 
at 1913 (“[E]xceptionalism on the very issue that has been offered as the 
leading example of tax exceptionalism—deference standards in the aftermath 
of Chevron—turns out to be not exceptional.”). 
 31. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 32. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two 
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1258 (1997) (“[T]he prestige of 
Chevron lingers on. . . . In fact, the understanding that Chevron is a leading 
case on deference has now percolated upwards and finds sporadic, though far 
from consistent, recognition in the Supreme Court. Thus, in that Court, as 
elsewhere, jurists periodically speak of ‘Chevron’ as shorthand for ‘the 
principle of deference on questions of statutory interpretation.’”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006) (“[Chevron] shows 
no sign of losing its influence . . . on the contrary, the decision has become 
foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text . . . .”). 
 33. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704, 713 (2011) (“[T]he principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply 
with full force in the tax context”). 
 34. See Stephanie R. Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax 
Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221 (2014). 
 35. Id. at 228. 
 36. Id. at 245 (“In sum, unless Congress has directed otherwise by statute, 
the APA’s default provisions apply to a court’s review of agency action.”). 
 37. See id. at 228 (“At first blush, the Tax Court’s current approach of 
more searching de novo review may appear to best protect the unrepresented 
taxpayer. In contrast, by confining review to abuse of discretion and 
prohibiting consideration of evidence outside of the administrative record, the 
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Whether that is the correct answer as a doctrinal matter is 
harder to determine than one might expect, as discussed below. 
From a policy perspective, the issue of Tax Court 
exceptionalism is larger than a focus on just the APA may 
suggest. Although it would certainly be possible for the current 
Tax Court to implement APA procedures without making other 
structural changes, a piecemeal approach is not particularly 
efficient. Experience has shown that litigants will continue to 
raise issues about the Tax Court’s structure as long as it is 
different from other courts.38 Thinking through the Tax Court’s 
structure on a macro level, to conform the structure to those of 
other courts, will help reduce these attacks. 
The broad point of this Reply is therefore that the question 
of whether the APA applies to the Tax Court is a symptom of a 
larger problem that is overdue for resolution—the unclear 
nature of the post-1969 Tax Court. I have shown in previous 
work how this structural gap makes the Tax Court unusually 
unaccountable for its actions and susceptible to departures 
from judicial norms.39 In this Reply, I explore the doctrinal 
confusion over the question of whether the Tax Court 
constitutes a “reviewing court” within the meaning of the APA. 
The next Parts of this Reply delve into the historical 
development of the APA to try to elucidate the meaning of that 
term and the phrase “court of the United States.” The Reply 
concludes that there is no clear doctrinal answer as to whether 
those terms include the Tax Court. Accordingly, this is yet 
another area in which the uncertain place of the Tax Court in 
the federal government’s organizational scheme has caused 
problems. 
 
APA limits a court’s ability to grant relief when it feels such relief may be 
merited.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reviewing 
an argument that the President’s right to remove a Tax Court judge violates 
separation of powers); Megibow v. Clerk of the U.S. Tax Court, No. 04 Civ. 
3321 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17698, at *13, *20 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 
2004) (addressing Freedom of Information Act request); see also Freytag v. 
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (addressing a challenge under the Appointments 
Clause of the Constitution to the assignment of a case to a Special Trial 
Judge).  
 39. See Lederman, supra note 17. 
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I.  “REVIEWING COURTS” AND “COURTS OF THE  
UNITED STATES”   
The APA was enacted in 1946 to provide consistent rules 
for administrative agencies.40 As Professor Diane Fahey has 
explained, “The APA can be roughly divided into two sections: 
(1) those specifying the procedures agencies are to use when 
performing their rulemaking or adjudicatory functions, and (2) 
those specifying the standards courts are to employ when 
reviewing agency action.”41 Decades ago, the Tax Court 
confused the two functions, holding that “the United States Tax 
Court is established as a court of record under article I of the 
Constitution of the United States. Being a court of the United 
States, it is excluded from the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”42 As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
later explained, that case “focused erroneously on the status of 
the reviewing court, rather than on the status of the 
administrative body rendering the decision under review. The 
Internal Revenue Service, of course, is an agency of the 
government, and review of its decisions may be governed by the 
APA.”43 
The linchpin of the question of whether the APA’s “scope of 
review” provision, 5 U.S.C. § 706, applies to the Tax Court, is 
whether the Tax Court constitutes a “reviewing court” within 
the meaning of that section. That section makes two major 
points. First, it addresses the standard of review, stating, in 
part: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning 
 
 40. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) 
(attempting “to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair 
administrative procedure”).  
 41. Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court Exempt from 
Administrative Law Jurisprudence When Acting As a Reviewing Court?, 58 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603, 633–34 (2010). 
 42. Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972). 
 43. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 n.5 (8th Cir. 2006). During a 
failed attempt to move the Tax Court out of Title 26 into the Judicial Code, 
members of the House expressed the view that making the Tax Court a “court 
of record” would make it not subject to the APA. See 93 CONG. REC. 8391 
(1947) (statement of Rep. Devitt) (“This bill titles the Tax Court a court of 
record. This relieves the court of the necessity of complying with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.”). However, context indicates that the reference 
was to the agency provisions of the APA. See id. (“The Lincoln Electric Co. case 
held that the Tax Court is subject to the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act” and that Lincoln Electric “recognize[d] the Tax Court, not as a 
court, but as an administrative agency of Government”). 
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or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court 
shall— 
  (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed; and 
  (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be— 
  (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law . . . .44 
Then, on the issue of the scope of review, the “record rule” in 
the same statute provides, “In making the foregoing 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party . . . .”45  
Thus, to determine whether the APA’s standard of review 
of “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law”46 applies, the question is whether 
the Tax Court is a “reviewing court.” The statute uses the 
shorter term “court” in the sentence on the record rule. In 
context, however, the statute appears to be referring to the 
same court addressed by the “reviewing court” language.47 
Professors Hoffer and Walker argue that the Tax Court 
constitutes a “reviewing court,” explaining: 
Under the APA, an individual “aggrieved” by an IRS action . . . “is 
entitled to judicial review . . . in a court of the United States” so long 
as the IRS action is “reviewable by statute” or is otherwise a “final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 
Moreover, the Tax Court is no longer an administrative agency that 
reviews the actions of another administrative agency. Instead, as 
discussed in Part I.A, in 1969 Congress transformed the Tax Court 
into an “[A]rticle I . . . court of record to be known as the United 
States Tax Court.” For purposes of the APA, it is therefore “a court of 
the United States,” and, for its review of the IRS’s actions, a 
“reviewing court” subject to the APA’s judicial review provisions.48 
 
 44. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2)(A) (2012). 
 45. Id. § 706 (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 47. See id. § 706 (referring to the “reviewing court” throughout, until the 
flush language that finishes the section and refers to “the foregoing 
determinations,” which uses simply “court”). 
 48. Hoffer & Walker, supra note 34, at 250 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, 
in the Introduction to their article, Professors Hoffer and Walker argue: 
The APA judicial review standards apply to any “reviewing court” of 
agency action. The IRS, an executive agency within the Treasury 
Department, is plainly an “agency” for purposes of the APA. And 
while the Tax Court used to be an agency before the enactment of the 
APA, as of 1969 it is an Article I court. For purposes of the APA, it is 
thus “a court of the United States,” and, for its review of IRS agency 
actions, a “reviewing court” subject to the APA’s judicial review 
provisions. 
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The “court of the United States” point is supported with a 
citation to section 702 of the APA, and the “reviewing court” 
issue is supported with a citation to section 706.49 However, 
these sections do not directly address those propositions.50  
Perhaps surprisingly, neither “court of the United States” 
nor “reviewing court” is defined anywhere in the APA.51 While 
it may seem that any “court of record,” which a section of the 
Internal Revenue Code says the Tax Court is,52 should 
constitute a “court of the United States”53 and, when reviewing 
 
Id. at 228–29 (footnotes omitted). They cite sections701(b) and 702 of the APA 
in support of their point that the Tax Court is a “court of the United States,” 
id. at 227 & n.35, and section 706 of the APA in support of the assertion that it 
is a “reviewing court,” id. at 227 & n.34. 
 49.  Id. at 250 & nn.176–77 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706). 
 50. Neither section addresses the Tax Court or defines any terms. See 5 
U.S.C. §§ 702, 706. Section 706 is quoted in part above. See supra text 
accompanying notes 43, 45. Section 702 of the APA states: 
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a 
court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages 
and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof 
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal 
authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the 
ground that it is against the United States or that the United States 
is an indispensable party. 
5 U.S.C. § 702.  
Interestingly, section 702 does not explicitly say that judicial review must 
take place in a “court of the United States.” That section provides for judicial 
review in the first sentence, and in the second goes on to provide that certain 
actions against agency officials are not barred in “court[s] of the United 
States” on the specific “ground that it is against the United States or that the 
United States is an indispensable party.” Id. The second sentence therefore 
seems to be self-contained. And, in fact, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
explained, prior to 1976, section 702 contained only the first sentence quoted 
above. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 892 (1988) (citing S. REP. NO. 
94-996, at 19–20 (1976)). “[I]t is undisputed that the 1976 amendment to § 702 
was intended to broaden the avenues for judicial review of agency action by 
eliminating the defense of sovereign immunity in cases covered by the 
amendment . . . .” Id. at 891–92. Thus, the inclusion there of the phrase “court 
of the United States” does not necessarily modify the first sentence, which 
dates back to 1946. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 
§ 10(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (“RIGHT OF REVIEW.—Any person suffering 
legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 
such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to 
judicial review thereof.”). 
 51. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. 
 52. See I.R.C. § 7441 (2012). 
 53. See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 34, at 250 (“[I]n 1969 Congress 
transformed the Tax Court into an ‘[A]rticle I . . . court of record to be known 
as the United States Tax Court.’ For purposes of the APA, it is therefore ‘a 
court of the United States’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
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agency action, a “reviewing court,” those terms could be 
narrower. For example, in theory, the phrase “court of the 
United States” could refer only to Article III courts, and 
“reviewing court” could be referring only to each court defined 
as a “court of the United States.” In fact, Professors Hoffer and 
Walker contemplate that possibility, stating, “Perhaps a 
stronger argument that the APA does not govern is that only 
Article III courts—not Article I courts—can be ‘reviewing 
courts’ for purposes of the APA.” 54 However, Congress did not 
refer to “reviewing courts of the United States.” Perhaps “court” 
is a term that encompasses more judicial bodies than “court of 
the United States” does, with only the latter limited to Article 
III tribunals.  
A. THE APA AS ENACTED 
This analysis may prompt the question as to why Congress 
referred to “court[s] of the United States” in the sections 
defining by exclusion the term “agency” but referred to 
reviewing “court” tout court55 in the section governing the scope 
of review. The answer lies in the history of the APA. When the 
APA was enacted, it did not use the term “court of the United 
States.”56 For example, section 2, a definitional section, states, 
“‘Agency’ means each authority (whether or not within or 
subject to review by another agency) or the Government of the 
United States other than Congress, the courts, or the 
governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District of 
Columbia.”57 Section 10 deals with judicial review, stating in 
part,  
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency 
action is by law committed to agency discretion . . . Any person 
suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely 
 
 54. Id. at 251. Professors Hoffer and Walker argue that “in Freytag v. 
Commissioner, the Supreme Court rejected such an Article I/Article III court 
distinction.” Id. at 252. Of course, Freytag was not only interpreting a different 
document—the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, rather than the 
APA—it was interpreting different terminology, as Hoffer and Walker 
recognize. See id. at 252 (“[T]he Freytag Court was interpreting the meaning of 
‘Courts of Law’ under the Constitution and not the meaning of ‘court of the 
United States’ and ‘reviewing court’ under the APA . . . .”). They argue that 
“the interpretative reasoning counsels the same result.” Id. However, as this 
argument reflects, the Supreme Court has not spoken on the APA question. 
 55. Please forgive the rhetorical flourish—the author has trouble resisting 
plays on words.  
 56. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946).  
 57. Id. § 2 (emphasis added). 
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affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any 
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.58 
The term “reviewing court” first appears later in section 10 
of the Public Law. First, the statute authorizes “interim relief” 
in certain circumstances: 
Pending judicial review any agency is authorized, where it finds that 
justice so requires, to postpone the effective date of any action taken 
by it. Upon such conditions as may be required and to the extent 
necessary to prevent irreparable injury, every reviewing court 
(including every court to which a case may be taken on appeal from or 
upon application for certiorari or other writ to a reviewing court) is 
authorized to issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone 
the effective date of any agency action or to preserve status or rights 
pending conclusion of the review proceedings.59 
The “scope of review” provision follows, reading much as it does 
today: 
So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning 
or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law . . . . In making the foregoing 
determinations the court shall review the whole record or such 
portions thereof as may be cited by any party . . . .60 
Thus, at the time the APA was enacted, the judicial bodies 
that were excluded as a definitional matter from the term 
“agency” were those that constituted “courts.” The term “court” 
carried throughout the statute, with the section on judicial 
review clarifying that appellate courts also constituted 
“reviewing court[s],” at least for purposes of obtaining interim 
relief from agency action. Because the definition of “agency” 
excluded “courts,” and the judicial review provisions referred to 
a “reviewing court,” there was a strong textual argument that a 
reviewing court could not also be an “agency” within the 
meaning of the APA.  
B. THE APA AS CODIFIED IN THE U.S. CODE 
In 1966, Congress codified Title 5 of the U.S. Code, and, in 
so doing, changed some terms in order “to attain uniformity 
within the title” and “conform to common contemporary 
usage.”61 That was when the term “courts” in the definition of 
 
 58. Id. § 10(a). 
 59. Id. § 10(d) (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. § 10(e) (emphasis added). 
 61. S. REP. NO. 89-1380, at 19 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 SENATE REPORT]. 
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the term “agency” was changed to “courts of the United 
States.”62 The amended language appears troublesome because 
it uses the term “courts of the United States” in the agency 
definition63 but still uses the term “reviewing court” in the 
judicial review provisions. In theory, “courts of the United 
States” could exclude the Tax Court while the term “courts” 
could include it and all other Article I courts.64 The result of 
this line of reasoning would be to have some courts, such as the 
Tax Court, constituting both an “agency” and a “reviewing 
court” within the meaning of the APA.65 That result would seem 
odd because it would apparently require the Tax Court to follow 
all of the procedures applicable to agencies, which are a poor fit 
for a judicial body.66 That result would also be contrary to the 
 
 62. See McQuiston v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 807, 811 n.7 (1982) (“On Sept. 6, 
1966, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966), was enacted . . . . The act changed 
the definition of ‘agency’ to exclude ‘the courts of the United States’ rather 
than simply ‘the courts.’”); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964 & Supp. I 1965–66) 
(defining “agency” as “each authority (whether or not within or subject to 
review by another agency) of the Government of the United States other than 
Congress, the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or the 
District of Columbia” (emphasis added)).  
 63. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(B); 701(b)(1)(B). 
 64. As an analogy, 28 U.S.C. § 451 states that “[t]he term ‘court of the 
United States’ includes the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of 
appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the 
Court of International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the 
judges of which are entitled to hold office during good behavior.” That term 
therefore excludes the Tax Court, for example, which, by statute, is “a court of 
record,” I.R.C. § 7441 (2012), that is not listed and the judges of which have set 
terms rather than having life tenure. Cf. McQuiston, 78 T.C. at 811 n.7  (“It is 
clear under 28 U.S.C. sec. 451 that the phrase ‘court of the United States’ 
refers only to art. III courts. The question thus arises as to whether the phrase 
has the same meaning in the Administrative Procedure Act, . . . such that the 
only courts excluded from the definition of ‘agency’ contained therein are art. 
III courts.”) 
 65. Professors Hoffer and Walker argue that “if the Tax Court were not a 
‘court’ under the APA, then, by statutory definition it would be an ‘agency’—a 
position that the Tax Court has correctly rejected.” Hoffer & Walker, supra 
note 34, at 251. That was true under the original version of the APA, because 
the definition of “agency” excluded “courts” but presumably not other types of 
entities the Tax Court might have qualified as. It should remain true under 
the current version of the statute, which says “courts of the United States” 
instead of “courts,” if—as suggested by the legislative history—this was a 
nonsubstantive semantic change. See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying 
text. 
 66. See 93 CONG. REC. 8387 (1947) (statement of Rep. Robsion) (“If the 
Tax Court is required to conform to the [agency provisions of the] 
Administrative Procedure Act, it is believed that its work would be increased 
many times and that the court would be unable to function as it now 
functions.”); id. at 8390 (statement of Rep. Devitt) (explaining that the agency 
provisions of the APA would bog down the Tax Court to an impractical extent 
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original approach of the APA, which excluded courts from the 
definition of “agency.”67   
The legislative history does not explain the wording 
change.68 However, it does plainly state that “[i]n making 
changes in the language, precautions have been taken against 
making substantive changes in any statute.”69 The legislative 
history also addresses the concern “that mere changes in 
terminology and style will result in changes in substance or 
impair the precedent value of earlier judicial decisions and 
other interpretations.”70 The report assures readers that that is 
not the case, citing a list of U.S. Supreme Court cases in 
support of the proposition that “in a codification statute, . . . the 
courts uphold the contrary presumption: the statute is intended 
to remain substantively unchanged.”71 Thus, the legislative 
 
because “under the Administrative Procedure Act a citizen whose case has 
been heard by a hearing commissioner may, as a matter of right, appeal to the 
agency as a whole.”).  
 67. See supra text accompanying note 57. If the Tax Court constituted an 
agency under the APA, the courts of appeals presumably would constitute the 
Tax Court’s “reviewing courts.” One might argue that the amendment in 1948 
of what is now Internal Revenue Code section 7482(a), providing that the 
courts of appeals must review the decisions of the Tax Court “in the same 
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil 
actions tried without a jury,” displaced the APA in that respect. See Robert C. 
Brown, The Nature of the Tax Court of the United States, 10 U. PITT. L. REV. 
298, 309 (1949) (arguing, while the Tax Court was still an agency, “[t]he 
Administrative Procedure Act has therefore no effect on the Tax Court. If it 
had any effect on review of the Tax Court (which is doubtful) that effect is 
wiped out by the more recent statute [the predecessor of I.R.C. § 7482(a)] 
abrogating the Dobson doctrine.”). However, the APA states that “Subsequent 
statute may not be held to supersede or modify this subchapter, chapter 7, 
sections 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(E), 5372, or 7521 of this title, or the 
provisions of section 5335(a)(B) of this title that relate to administrative law 
judges, except to the extent that it does so expressly.” 5 U.S.C. § 559. Section 
7482 says nothing about the APA. See I.R.C. § 7482. Yet, debate on the bill 
that included the predecessor of what is now section 7482—and attempted to 
make the Tax Court, then technically an agency, into a court—included 
criticism on the floor of the House of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lincoln 
Electric, which had held that the Tax Court was subject to the agency 
provisions of the APA. See 93 CONG. REC. 8387 (1947) (statement of Rep. 
Robsion) (“The decisions in the Dobson and the Lincoln Electric Co. cases have 
created a great deal of confusion . . . .”); id. at 8391 (statement of Rep. Devitt) 
(“The Lincoln Electric Co. case held that the Tax Court is subject to the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Immediate action is necessary 
by the Congress in order to clarify the status of the Tax Court.”). 
 68. See 1966 SENATE REPORT, supra note 61, at 27–28, 32–33 (explaining 
changes to 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 and 701 but not referencing the addition of the 
phrase “of the United States”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 11, 16 (1966) (same). 
 69. 1966 SENATE REPORT, supra note 61, at 19. 
 70. Id. at 20. 
 71. Id. at 21. 
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history indicates that we should read “court of the United 
States” as if it still read “court.”  
II.  THE APA AND THE TAX COURT: A HISTORIC PUZZLE   
The fact that the APA originally was consistent in using 
the term “court” throughout its many sections may enhance the 
statute’s clarity. However, at the time the APA was enacted, its 
application to the Tax Court was not self-evident. Recall that, 
until 1969, the Tax Court was still an executive agency,72 
though its name had been changed to the “Tax Court of the 
United States” in 1942.73 The advent of the APA was a major 
factor in an unsuccessful push in the late 1940s to move the 
provisions governing the Tax Court out of the Internal Revenue 
Code and into the Judicial Code—changing the Tax Court from 
an agency into a court—because, if the agency provisions of the 
APA applied to the Tax Court, the Tax Court would have to 
significantly alter its procedures.74 The Tax Court did not make 
those changes, which would have included “publish[ing] in the 
Federal Register a description of its central and field 
organization, statements as to its forms and procedures, and its 
substantive rules,”75 and on-demand review by the full court in 
any case decided by a single judge.76  
The legislative history of the APA provides conflicting 
information as to whether Congress intended to include the 
Tax Court as an agency for purposes of the APA. On the one 
hand, during a discussion of proposed language providing that 
“[e]very party shall be accorded the right to appear in person or 
by or with counsel or other duly qualified representative in any 
agency proceeding,”77 the issue of an agency disqualifying 
nonlawyer representation included a discussion of the “Tax 
 
 72. See Dubroff, supra note 16, at 1 (“In 1942, the name of the Board was 
changed to the Tax Court of the United States, but despite its new title the 
court’s status as an agency of the executive branch was not disturbed. Finally, 
in 1969, the court was established as a legislative court under article I of the 
Constitution.”). 
 73. Dubroff, supra note 2, at 98 n.237.  
 74. Dubroff, supra note 16, at 26–28 (referring to two significant problems 
prompting the effort to move the Tax Court provisions into the Judicial Code, 
one of which was the advent of the APA, which if its agency provisions applied, 
would require the Tax Court “to make substantial modifications in its 
procedures”).  
 75. Sydney R. Rubin, The Administrative Procedure Act and the Tax 
Court, 26 TAXES 255, 258–59 (1948). 
 76. Id. at 259. 
 77. 79 CONG. REC. 2156 (1946). 
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Board.”78 The senators seemed to assume that the Tax Board 
was an agency to which that language applied: 
  Mr. Ferguson: “Let us consider the Tax Board. Could the Board 
itself determine that certain individuals were qualified to appear and 
that other persons were not qualified to appear?” 
Mr. McCarran: “The answer to that question is ‘No.’ The Board could 
not do so. The Board would have to accept lawyers or nonlawyers as 
the case might be . . . .”  
Mr. Ferguson: Let us take the patent bar. 
Mr. McCarran: The same is true in that case. A certified public 
accountant, for instance, may not be a lawyer, but he could 
appear. . . . He would have to be permitted by the agency to appear.79 
It is unclear what the senators meant by “Tax Board.” That 
phrasing is closer to “Board of Tax Appeals” than to “Bureau of 
Internal Revenue,” but, of course, the Board of Tax Appeals’s 
name had been changed to “Tax Court of the United States” 
four years earlier.80 Nonetheless, Sydney Rubin, writing in 
1948, observed that, in this exchange, “it seems to have been 
tacitly assumed that the Tax Court is among the agencies 
covered.”81 
By contrast, as Professors Hoffer and Walker explain, and 
as Professor Diane Fahey has stated,82 the Tax Court was 
mentioned in another place in the legislative history in a 
context that suggests it was a reviewing court. In explaining 
what is now APA section 706(2)(F), which provides that a 
reviewing court shall set aside action by an agency that is 
“unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are 
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court,”83 the House 
Judiciary Committee Report states that “tax assessments not 
made upon a statutory administrative hearing and record may 
involve a trial of the facts in The Tax Court or the United 
States district courts.”84 The legislative history thus seems to 
use the Tax Court as an example of a reviewing court.85 
 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. The discussion goes on to suggest that agencies cannot prohibit 
lawyers from appearing before them but can require that nonlawyers have 
qualifications they deem relevant. See id. 
 80. See supra note 72. 
 81. Rubin, supra note 75, at 256.  
 82. See Fahey, supra note 41, at 636 (“[T]he Tax Court of the United 
States [was] not exempt from the APA but, rather, was used as an example of 
how section 706[] of the APA was intended to operate.”); Hoffer & Walker, 
supra note 32, at 232–33 (also making this point). 
 83. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2012). 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 45 (1946) (report of the House Judiciary 
Committee). 
 85. This predates the Tax Court’s innocent spouse and collection due 
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In addition, a letter the Attorney General, Justice Tom C. 
Clark, sent at the request of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee stated that, in the APA, “‘Courts’ includes the Tax 
Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of 
Claims, and similar courts,”86 which would exclude the Tax 
Court from the ambit of the “agency” definition. The Attorney 
General repeated that statement in his Manual on the APA, 
which was published in 1947, after the APA was enacted.87 The 
Attorney General’s Manual on the APA has been described by 
the Supreme Court as “a contemporaneous interpretation 
previously given some deference by this Court because of the 
role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the 
legislation . . . .”88  
Despite the Supreme Court’s deference to the Manual, 
scholars have criticized it as being a partisan document 
designed to “minimize the impact of the judicial review 
provisions of the APA”89 on agencies.90 Professor George 
 
process jurisdiction. The innocent spouse provision was enacted in 1971 and 
significantly expanded in 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring 
and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3106, 112 Stat. 685 (1998); An 
Act To Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 To Provide That in Certain 
Cases a Spouse Will Be Relieved of Liability Arising From a Joint Income Tax 
Return, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971). The collection due 
process provisions were enacted in 1998. See Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 § 3401. Given that innocent spouse and 
CDP proceedings did not exist at the time the APA was enacted, Professors 
Hoffer and Walker argue that Congress’s intent was to preserve de novo 
review in Tax Court deficiency cases.  See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 34, at 
254. They argue that the newer forms of Tax Court jurisdiction are subject to 
the APA’s default standard and scope of review. Id. at 259–61. 
 86. S. REP. NO. 79-752 app. B at 38 (1945). 
 87. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 10 (1947) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 79-752, at 38).  
 88. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978); 
see also Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication 
Agency To Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act 
Benefits Claims, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267, 330 (2003) (“The 
Manual is a part of the legislative history of the APA.”); cf. George B. 
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1663 (1996) (“Because the 
Senate committee appended [Attorney General] Clark’s letter and appendix to 
its report, an argument exists that the Senate adopted Clark’s material as its 
own interpretation. Thus, perhaps, Clark’s interpretation expresses legislative 
intent.”). 
 89. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 113, 195 n.410 (1998). 
 90. See id. at 119 (calling the Manual “a highly political document 
designed to minimize the impact of the new statute on executive agencies”); 
Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1683 (“The Court’s deference is suspect. No reason 
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Shepherd has described in detail the negotiations and political 
compromise that went into crafting the bill that became the 
APA, as well as both sides’ attempts to influence its 
interpretation.91 The result was very different interpretations of 
the bill by the Senate Judiciary Committee, which favored 
strong regulation of agencies, and the Attorney General, who 
represented the administration, which sought to limit the 
regulation of agencies.92 The Attorney General’s Manual was a 
result of this attempt to influence courts’ interpretation of the 
APA:  
The disagreement over the bill’s meaning continued in the House and 
Senate and in an avalanche of writing that thundered down after the 
bill’s passage. After the APA became law, groups whom the Act would 
affect sought to present their interpretations quickly, in time to 
influence courts that would interpret the Act. For example, soon after 
Truman signed the bill, the attorney general issued a long monograph 
that interpreted each of the bill’s provisions. As before, the attorney 
general interpreted the act in a manner that suppressed to a 
minimum the bill’s limits on agencies. For example, the monograph 
again argued that the Act’s section 10 did not expand the scope of 
judicial review, but merely codified courts’ existing approach.93 
Leading Administrative Law scholar John Duffy has pointed 
out that “Attorney General Clark had no support in the text of 
the statute or in its legislative history for the broad thesis that 
Section 10 was intended generally to be a restatement of 
current law” and that the Attorney General cited primarily to 
“passages from . . . letters sent to Congress by Clark himself.”94 
Given this political advocacy context, the Manual should not 
 
exists to give more weight to the Attorney General’s Manual than to 
conservatives’ contrasting interpretations. Perhaps courts should credit 
neither account.”); K.M. Lewis, Note, Text(Plus-Other-Stuff)ualism: 
Textualists’ Perplexing Use of the Attorney General’s Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 11 MICH. J. ENVIRON. & ADMIN. LAW 287, 289 
(2012) (“[T]here is evidence that the Manual may also offer a biased and 
politicized, and therefore dubious, interpretation of the APA.”). 
 91. Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1663 (“The bill had sprung not from 
public debate in Congress, as other bills had, but from months of private, off-
the-record negotiations. Each party sought to create a favorable account of the 
negotiations.”).  
 92. See id. (“The committee would have preferred a stronger bill. . . . In 
contrast, Attorney General Clark would have preferred a less intrusive bill.”). 
 93. Id. at 1665–66 (footnotes omitted); see also Duffy, supra note 89, at 
133 (explaining that the APA “represented a ‘bitter compromise’ among the 
warring parties. The Attorney General’s Manual was a post-hoc attempt ‘to 
create a record’ that would influence future reviewing courts in interpreting 
that compromise.” (quoting Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1681)). 
 94. Duffy, supra note 89, at 132. 
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necessarily be considered an objective interpretation of the law, 
especially on partisan issues.95  
Accordingly, it is worth observing that the Manual’s 
assertion that the Tax Court was not subject to the APA is 
completely consistent with the Attorney General’s apparent 
goal of limiting the effects of the APA on agencies. Nonetheless, 
relying on the Attorney General’s statement, Administrative 
Law Judge Robin Arzt has argued that the Tax Court and other 
non-article III courts constitute “courts of the United States” 
for this purpose: 
A close look at the three non-Article III courts cited in the Manual as 
examples of courts that are excluded from APA coverage clearly 
shows that Executive Branch Article I tribunals that review final 
administrative agency adjudications and Article II tribunals that 
review initial administrative agency adjudications that are labeled 
“courts” by Congress both are “courts of the United States” that were 
intended to be excluded from coverage by the APA adjudication 
procedure under 5 U.S.C. § 551-559.96 
Judge Arzt’s “close look” at the Tax Court is as follows:  
[T]he Tax Court has its origin in the Board of Tax Appeals, which was 
formed in 1924 as an Executive Branch board independent of the 
Internal Revenue Service to provide taxpayers with an independent 
administrative review of an IRS tax deficiency determination before 
the tax had to be paid. . . . Congress did not redefine the Tax Court 
into an Article I court until 1969. . . . The Supreme Court has held 
that the Tax Court was an Executive Branch agency until its 
conversion into an Article I court in 1969. Therefore, the Tax Court 
was functioning as an Article II “board model” independent agency in 
the Executive Branch that was doing appellate administrative review 
of initial decisions by the IRS, not judicial review of final agency 
decisions, at the time that the Attorney General stated that it was 
excluded from APA coverage because it is called a court. Thus, 
bearing the label “court” is enough to exclude an Article II 
independent agency from APA coverage.97 
The crux of Judge Arzt’s argument with respect to the Tax 
Court therefore is that because the Attorney General said that 
the Tax Court, which was not officially a court at the time, 
constituted a “court” for APA purposes, being named a “court” 
by Congress must be all a body needed to constitute a court for 
APA purposes. However, this does not show why the Attorney 
General’s analysis is correct. Mr. Rubin, by contrast, who was 
 
 95. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: 
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 779, 790 (2010) (“[A]lthough the Attorney General’s Manual should be 
considered when trying to understand the APA, . . . it may be unreliable when 
it advances a pro-executive point of view.”). 
 96. Arzt, supra note 88, at 331. 
 97. Id. at 333–34 (citations omitted). 
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writing long before the Tax Court became an Article I court, 
critiqued the Attorney General’s view:  
The Attorney General does not indicate how he arrives at this 
conclusion with respect to the Tax Court. The Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims are in quite a different 
category from the Tax Court. They are legislative courts of record 
provided for in the Judicial Code. They have been so recognized by the 
Supreme Court. Their judges, like the judges of constitutional courts, 
hold office during good behavior and retire with full pay. . . .98 
Rubin also pointed to the Committee reports, which excluded 
“only ‘legislative, judicial, and territorial authorities.’”99 He 
noted that the Tax Court was an independent agency, located 
in the executive branch.100 
Moreover, Mr. Rubin pointed out that the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure studied 
almost every executive agency, including the Board of Tax 
Appeals.101 “Nothing in the Final Report or the monograph 
indicates that the committee regarded the Board as unique or 
outside its principal recommendations. The contrary would 
seem to be clearly true.”102 Accordingly, he concludes, “Viewing 
the Tax Court against this background of the statute creating it 
and the history and purposes of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, it is reasonable to conclude that the Tax Court is among 
the agencies to which the act applies, and that the Attorney 
General’s ‘dictum’ to the contrary is wrong.”103  
In addition, the statutory language of the APA itself did 
not and does not address the status of the Tax Court.104 
Professor Harold Dubroff, who has published a definitive 
history of the Tax Court, suggested that Congress considered 
the Attorney General’s report sufficient to render a statement 
in the statute unnecessary.105 However, James Harte Levenson, 
a lawyer writing shortly after the APA was enacted, drew the 
opposite inference, stating, “Significantly, while the Senate 
committee appended the Attorney General’s favorable report to 
its report, it did not comment thereon.”106 Moreover, Professor 
 
 98. Rubin, supra note 75, at 256. 
 99. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-248, at 252 (1946)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 257.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 258. 
 104. Dubroff, supra note 16, at 27. 
 105. Id. (“An opinion of the Attorney General concluded that the Act would 
be inapplicable to the Tax Court and, apparently on this basis, the statute did 
not specify that the Tax Court was a court for purposes of the Act.”). 
 106. James Harte Levenson, Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act on 
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Dubroff’s view does not entirely line up with the history of the 
APA. Because the APA reflected a political compromise, it was 
consciously ambiguous on many points,107 intentionally leaving 
unresolved questions for courts to determine.108 And, in fact, the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated several times in 
1947, though generally in dicta, that the Tax Court was an 
agency and must therefore have its decisions reviewed under 
the standards in the APA (rather than the highly deferential 
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in its 1943 decision 
in Dobson v. Commissioner).109  
Also, it is interesting to note that the Tax Court published 
its public documents in the Federal Register until the court 
officially became an Article I court in 1969.110 Board of Tax 
Appeals documents appeared in the Federal Register starting 
with the Register’s second issue,111 presumably because the 
Federal Register Act required “agencies” to publish their rules 
in the Federal Register.112 The APA, once enacted, required 
 
Decisions of the Tax Court, 2 TAX L. REV. 103, 104 n.14 (1946). Levenson also 
noted, “No reference was given to support that conclusion. It would appear 
that the Attorney General was misled by the title of the ‘court.’” Id. at 104. 
 107. See Shepherd, supra note 88, at 1665 (“Ambiguity was essential to 
reaching agreement. Without it, no agreement could have occurred.”). 
 108. Id. (“[T]he parties intentionally included ambiguous provisions that 
courts would later interpret. Each party then hoped that the courts would 
resolve the ambiguities in the party’s favor.”). 
 109. 320 U.S. 489 (1943); see Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Comm’r, 162 F.2d 379, 
382 (1947) (“While our conclusion is that review of Tax Court decisions is 
governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, it does not become necessary 
. . . to particularize in what respect our power to review has been enlarged, 
except to say that it doubtless has been broadened and that it will be time 
enough to consider the precise application of the Act when clear-cut questions 
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law are brought to us for review.”); see 
also Lawton v. Comm’r, 164 F.2d 380, 383 (1947) (“Conceiving the controlling 
question to be one of law, we are not presently concerned with the question 
whether review of the Tax Court’s decisions is governed by the Administrative 
Procedures Act . . . .”); Dawson v. Comm’r, 163 F.2d 664, 667 (1947) (“In this 
case, the facts are such that we would reach the same conclusion even though 
our powers of review under the Act, Title 5 U.S.C.A. 1009(e), were as broad as 
those urged upon us by petitioner, a question we do not decide.”). 
 110. See Deletion of Chapter, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,462 (Aug. 5, 1970) 
(“[P]ublication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of the Court’s public notices, 
orders, rules, and other public documents is no longer within the purview of 
the Administrative Procedure Act”). 
 111. Amendments to Rules for Practice Before The United States Board Of 
Tax Appeals, 1 Fed. Reg. 29 (Mar. 17, 1936). The Tax Court continued to 
publish documents in the Federal Register after its name change in 1942. See 
8 Fed. Reg. 1781 (Feb. 10, 1943) (“Chapter III—The Tax Court of the United 
States”). 
 112. Federal Register Act, Pub. L. No. 74-220, §§ 4–5, 49 Stat. 500 (1935) 
(requiring certain types of documents to be published in the Federal Register, 
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agencies to also publish interpretive or policy statements, as 
well as notices of proposed rulemaking.113  
Once the Tax Court became an Article I court in 1969, it 
announced that it would no longer publish its public documents 
in the Federal Register, and for that reason: 
Whereas the Tax Reform Act of 1969 . . . amending section 7441 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, established the U.S. Tax Court as a court of 
record under article I of the Constitution of the United States; and 
Whereas, publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of the Court’s 
public notices, orders, rules, and other public documents is no longer 
within the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act: 
Now, therefore, the material appearing under Chapter II, Title 26 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, is deleted, and the codification 
determinations assigned to the Court in its former status under the 
executive branch of the Government are relinquished.114 
The italicized language, in particular, suggests that the Tax 
Court’s position was that until it became an Article I court, it 
was an “agency” subject to the APA’s publication requirements 
applicable to federal agencies.115  
 
including “any order, regulation, rule, certificate, . . . notice, or similar 
instrument issued, prescribed, or promulgated by a Federal agency”). The 
definition of “agency” in the Federal Register Act was (and is) “the President of 
the United States, or any executive department, independent board, 
establishment, bureau, agency, institution, commission, or separate office of 
the administrative branch of the Government of the United States but not the 
legislative or judicial branches of the Government . . . .” Id. at § 4; cf. 44 U.S.C. 
§ 1501 (2012) (referring to “an executive department” instead of “any executive 
department”). At the time, the Board of Tax Appeals was an “independent 
board . . . of the administrative branch” of government. See Daniel L. 
Ginsburg, Is the Tax Court Constitutional?, 35 MISS. L.J. 382, 386 (1964) 
(“Although the Tax Court is still described as ‘an independent agency in the 
executive branch of government,’ its decisions and functions during its entire 
existence have been wholly judicial . . . .”).  
 113. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, §§ 3(a) & 4(a), 60 
Stat. 237 (1946) (requiring agencies to publish “statements of general policy or 
interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the 
public” and “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making”); see also OFFICE OF THE 
FED. REGISTER, A BRIEF HISTORY COMMEMORATING THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE FIRST ISSUE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER MARCH 
14, 1936, at 6 (2006), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the 
-federal-register/history.pdf (noting these requirements and stating, “The APA 
transformed the Federal Register from being merely a source of authoritative 
information about regulations to being an integral part of the democratic, 
quasi-legislative process by which those regulations were formed.”). 
 114. Deletion of Chapter, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,462 (emphasis added). 
 115. Cf. Rubin, supra note 75, at 256 (“The Tax Court, both before and 
after its change in name [to the Tax Court of the United States], apparently 
has regarded itself as an ‘agency’ rather than as a ‘court’ within the Federal 
Register Act, for it has consistently published its rules as ‘agencies’ under that 
act are required to do. . . . Yet, in view of the interrelation of the two acts, and 
particularly in view of their respective definitions of ‘agency,’ it is hard to see 
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Thus, at a minimum, there was some confusion as to 
whether the Tax Court constituted an agency for APA purposes 
before Congress made it an Article I court in 1969. If the pre-
1969 Tax Court constituted a “court” for APA purposes, then 
presumably the 1969 legislative change did not terminate its 
status as a court. But if the Tax Court was not a court within 
the meaning of the APA before the 1969 legislation, did it 
become one in 1969? The Tax Court’s statement that it was no 
longer subject to the APA provisions requiring its public 
documents to appear there116 shows that the court thought it 
was no longer subject to the APA’s agency provisions. That 
could suggest that the Tax Court considered itself a “court” for 
all APA purposes. However, the Tax Court did not say so.117 
III.  THE NEED FOR DOCTRINAL CLARITY   
Assuming that the post-1969 Tax Court constitutes a 
“court” for APA purposes, is it a “reviewing court”? The APA 
does not define the term “reviewing court.” However, a look at 
the context in which section 706 appears is helpful. Chapter 7 
of the APA is the chapter that deals with judicial review.118 It 
begins with a statement that “(a) This chapter applies, 
according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that—
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”119 That section goes on 
to define “agency” to exclude “courts of the United States,” just 
as Chapter 5, the chapter governing administrative 
procedure,120 does.121 As discussed above, Congress apparently 
intended that phrase to mean the same thing as “courts.”122 
Moreover, the chapter does not limit judicial review to “the 
courts of the United States.”123 Instead, Section 703, which 
 
why the Tax Court should be an ‘agency’ for purposes of one act, but a ‘court’ 
for purposes of the other.”). Of course, “agency” is defined differently in the 
Federal Register Act than it is in the APA; in particular, the Federal Register 
Act focuses on the branch where an entity is situated, defining the term to 
exclude entities in “the legislative or judicial branch of government.” See supra 
note 112; 44 U.S.C. § 1501 (Federal Register Act’s definition). 
 116. See Deletion of Chapter, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,462. 
 117. In its opinions addressing the APA, the Tax Court generally has said 
that it is not subject to it at all, not just that the APA’s agency provisions do 
not apply to it. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.  
 118. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2012). 
 119. Id. § 701(a). 
 120. See id. §§ 551 et seq.  
 121. Compare id. § 701(b)(1)(B) with id. § 551(1)(B). 
 122. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
 123. Section 702 provides a right of judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A 
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provides the “[f]orm and venue of proceeding,” states in part, 
“The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special 
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a 
court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy 
thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions 
for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory 
injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent 
jurisdiction.”124  
In addition, the early sections of chapter 7 set up the right 
of judicial review, and, in section 704, which actions are 
reviewable.125 Only then does Chapter 7 introduce the term 
“reviewing court.” Section 705 provides: 
When an agency finds that justice so requires, it may postpone the 
effective date of action taken by it, pending judicial review. On such 
conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent 
irreparable injury, the reviewing court, including the court to which a 
case may be taken on appeal from or on application for certiorari or 
other writ to a reviewing court, may issue all necessary and 
appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action 
or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review 
proceedings.126 
 
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”). Section 704 further provides, “Agency 
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is 
no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” Id. § 704. 
These sections refer to “the courts of the United States” only once, providing 
that “[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than 
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee 
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal 
authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground 
that it is against the United States or that the United States is an 
indispensable party.” Id. § 702. 
 124. Id. § 703 (emphasis added). 
 125. Section 704 provides: 
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to 
judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency 
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the 
review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly 
required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the 
purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or 
determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of 
reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and 
provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to 
superior agency authority. 
Id. § 704.  
 126. Id. § 705 (emphasis added). 
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This section therefore seems to treat a court engaging in 
judicial review as a “reviewing court.”127 It does not determine 
which court can provide such review; section 703 already 
provided that the appropriate venue is “a court specified by 
statute or . . . a court of competent jurisdiction.”128 Accordingly, 
if the Tax Court is a “court” within the meaning of the APA, 
when it has jurisdiction provided by statute to review an 
agency determination, it is functioning as a “reviewing court” 
and section 706 applies.129  
Unfortunately, case law does not provide an answer to the 
question of whether the Tax Court constitutes a “court” for APA 
purposes. As The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism explains, 
in its opinions addressing the APA, the Tax Court generally 
has said that it is not subject to it.130 In rejecting the clear 
guideposts of the APA, the Tax Court has instead fashioned its 
own rules and procedures—sometimes broadening its review of 
particular matters131 and sometimes vacillating.132 Some 
appellate courts have agreed that the APA does not apply to 
 
 127. Cf. Michael Kaminsky, Judicial Review of Procedures in the Internal 
Revenue Service, 36 TAXES 172, 175 (1958) (“The statute is completely 
absorbed with the adjective ‘reviewing,’ and treats the noun ‘court’ simply as a 
handy term for identification. There could easily have been substituted 
‘tribunal,’ and no violence to the meaning of the statute would have 
resulted.”). 
 128. 5 U.S.C. § 703. 
 129. Cf. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he United States Tax Court is now a court that exercises the 
judicial authority of the United States, and that puts it on a different plane 
from where it began. Because the IRS is an ‘agency,’ the Tax Court is a 
‘reviewing court’ for purposes of the APA . . .”). 
 130. See Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 117 (2008) (“Since its enactment 
in 1946 the APA has generally not governed proceedings in this Court . . . .”); 
Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 96 (2004) (“The APA has never governed 
proceedings in the Court (or in the Board of Tax Appeals).”), rev’d, 439 F.3d 
455 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 131. See Robinette, 123 T.C. at 99  (refusing to apply the “record rule” in 
the CDP context and stating, “Nothing in the legislative history of section 
6330 or 6320 indicates that the APA applies or that the Court’s review is 
limited to the administrative record.”); see also Hoffer & Walker, supra note 
34, at 261–62 (explaining that the Tax Court uses the “abuse of discretion” 
standard in CDP cases, but not because of the APA, and that the court 
concluded in Robinette that its review was not limited to the administrative 
record). 
 132. The Tax Court has not been entirely consistent in the standard and 
scope of review it applies to equitable innocent spouse determinations. See 
Hoffer & Walker, supra note 34, at 257 (explaining how “[t]he Tax Court’s 
position on its own standard and scope of review for innocent spouse claims for 
equitable relief has shifted over time.”). 
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the Tax Court, though not without dissenters.133 Other 
appellate courts have disagreed, finding that the APA does 
govern the Tax Court’s review of IRS action in various 
contexts.134 This would therefore be a difficult area in which to 
say that Congress has “acquiesced” to a consistent, 
longstanding interpretation.135 
Thus, what the lengthy analysis in this Reply 
demonstrates most clearly is that there is no simple doctrinal 
answer to the question of whether the Tax Court is a 
“reviewing court” or even a “court” for purposes of the APA. 
Professors Hoffer and Walker’s view, if adopted, would answer 
this basic set of questions, and, fortunately, would do so in a 
way that combats tax insularity. 
It may seem odd that there is no easy, straightforward 
answer as to whether such an important federal tribunal as the 
U.S. Tax Court constitutes a “court” for APA purposes. But 
then, there is no clear answer as to which branch of 
 
 133. See Wilson, 705 F.3d at 990 (2-1 decision stating, in part, “[t]he 
extensive legislative history of these provisions demonstrates that the special 
procedures enacted by Congress displace application of the APA in innocent 
spouse tax relief cases, and the APA does not apply.”); Comm’r v. Neal, 557 
F.3d 1262, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009) (2-1 decision agreeing with the Tax Court 
that the APA’s “record rule” does not apply and stating, in part, that “[t]he 
legislative history of the APA contains a clear intent to exempt the Tax 
Court.”); cf. O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 1959) (stating, in 
the era when the Tax Court was an administrative agency and before it had 
innocent spouse and collection due process jurisdiction, “The Tax Court, rather 
than being a ‘reviewing court’ . . . reviewing the ‘record’, is a court in which the 
facts are triable de novo.”), aff’g 28 T.C. 698 (1957). 
 134. See, e.g., Murphy v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The 
reasons supporting application of the administrative record rule in district 
court CDP hearing appeals have equal force where the appeal takes place in 
the Tax Court.”); Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F. 3d 455, 459–60 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(“Robinette’s contention . . . is that the review of decisions by an IRS appeals 
officer under § 6330 should be exempt from both the statutory framework of 
the APA and from general principles of administrative law that limit the scope 
of  judicial review to the administrative record. We are not persuaded that 
Congress endorsed such a departure when it authorized pre-deprivation 
judicial review of IRS levy activity in the Tax Court and the United States 
District Courts.”); cf. Mitchell v. Comm’r, 292 F.3d 800, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(“As the decision whether to grant this equitable relief is committed by its 
terms to the discretion of the Secretary, the Tax Court and this Court review 
such a decision for abuse of discretion.”).  
 135. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 
Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 554–55 (1992) (“Also controversial in the 1980s has 
been the Court’s legislative acquiescence doctrine. Under this doctrine of 
statutory interpretation, the Court will often presume that Congress 
‘acquiesces’ in settled interpretations of the statute by the Supreme Court, 
lower court consensus, or administrative agencies.”). 
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government the Tax Court belongs to.136 Currently, the Tax 
Court is exceptional—it is exempt from many of the rules and 
institutions that govern the Article III courts and the Article I 
Court of Federal Claims.137  
A Supreme Court decision holding that the APA applies to 
the Tax Court in the same way it applies to other reviewing 
courts would be very helpful, but that would just be a start. To 
truly end Tax Court exceptionalism would require the federal 
government to treat the Tax Court like other federal courts. A 
straightforward approach I previously proposed would be to 
make the Tax Court subject to the Administrative Office of U.S. 
Courts, the U.S. Judicial Conference, and the Rules Enabling 
Act.138 Those steps would strike a critical blow against Tax 
Court exceptionalism, making the court much more 
transparent and accountable. At the same time, Congress could 
define the term “court of the United States” in the APA and 
expressly include the Tax Court. In other words, the more the 
Tax Court can be brought into the judicial fold, the fewer 
problems its Article I status and agency history will cause. 
  CONCLUSION   
Professors Hoffer and Walker have done a tremendous 
service by combining their tax and administrative law expertise 
with a focused look at the Tax Court. The question of whether 
the Tax Court is exempt from the judicial review provisions 
that apply to other courts reviewing agency action is an 
important and recurring one.139 This Reply argues that 
although the policy goal of reducing Tax Court exceptionalism 
is laudatory, the doctrinal answer regarding whether the APA 
applies to the Tax Court is much less clear than Professors 
Hoffer and Walker suggest. Instead, what a close look at the 
history of the APA and the Tax Court’s actions shows is that 
 
 136. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 17–19, 25 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Lederman, supra note 17, at 1199 (“Congress should recognize the 
entirely judicial nature of the Tax Court by making it subject to the AOUSC; 
the Rules Enabling Act; and, with respect to its rulemaking, the Judicial 
Conference.  These straightforward but important structural changes should 
decrease the Tax Court’s insularity, increase its accountability, and help 
reduce inefficiencies.”). 
 139. For cases addressing this issue, see, e.g., Murphy, 469 F.3d at 31; 
O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 1959); Robinette v. Comm’r, 
123 T.C. 85, 96 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006); Porter v. Comm’r, 
130 T.C. 115, 117 (2008). For a discussion of the split in the circuits on the 
standard and scope of review of innocent spouse decisions, see Hoffer & 
Walker, supra note 34, at 257–58. 
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there is conflicting evidence regarding Congress’s intent. Yet, it 
makes little sense for the Tax Court to apply different 
standards in its review of IRS actions than other courts do, 
without justification.140 That creates opportunities for forum 
shopping that are more available to wealthy taxpayers, who 
can afford to pay the tax up front.141 
Ultimately, what The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism 
shows is that there is an urgent need to classify the Tax Court 
in the federal scheme. The question of the APA’s application to 
the Tax Court is just one important symptom of a much larger 
problem. The time to make the Tax Court more judicial is upon 
us. 
 
 140. See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 34, at 225 (“[L]ittle has been done to 
conform the Tax Court’s standards and procedures to those of its sister 
courts—the Article III federal district courts and the Article I United States 
Court of Federal Claims . . . .”); cf. Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing 
Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835 (2014) (arguing for application 
of the same standards to apply to review of Tax Court decisions as apply to 
district court decisions). 
 141. Full payment of the tax in issue is a prerequisite to litigation in the 
district courts and Court of Federal Claims. See Flora v. United States, 362 
U.S. 145, 177 (1960) (“Reargument has but fortified our view that § 1346 
(a)(1), correctly construed, requires full payment of the assessment before an 
income tax refund suit can be maintained in a Federal District Court.”); Shore 
v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The Flora full payment 
rule requires that taxpayers prepay the tax principal before the Court of 
Federal Claims will have subject matter jurisdiction over their tax refund 
action . . . .”). By contrast, in the Tax Court, the taxpayer need not pay any tax 
found to be due until the conclusion of the litigation. See Lederman, supra 
note 140, at 1836–37 & n.2. 
